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coherent account, surely a necessity if they are claimed to all have their
source in God. Perhaps part of the trouble is that so little is written today
on what it might mean to call God beautiful. Of course, if something like
Aquinas’s three criteria for beauty were to be employed, the application to
God makes good sense, but then the word is seldom now used in this way.
Even cutting the Gordian knot and switching to an alternative term such as
the aesthetically pleasing would provide only the superficial appearance of
a solution, since, given the quite different sources of Tallon’s three categories, what significance, if any, attaches to the use of the shared term would
still remain as mysterious as ever, and still more so how it might find its
ultimate source in God. So one looks forward to a sequel from the author
to this challenging and fascinating book that will carry forward discussion
of such questions.

Theology without Metaphysics: God, Language, and the Spirit of Recognition,
by Kevin W. Hector. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011. 293
pages. $75.00 (paperback).
Jeff Snapper, University of Notre Dame
In Theology without Metaphysics Kevin Hector endeavors to rid theology of
metaphysics without giving up true beliefs about God. Why should anyone want theology to be metaphysics-free? Because of the violence thesis,
the thesis that metaphysics (and anything that is metaphysical) does violence to objects by forcing them into categories. Given the violence thesis,
if theology is metaphysical, it does violence to God. Hector, admirably,
wants to do theology without doing violence to God. He endorses the
violence thesis. He concludes (rightly, given his premises) that we should
rid theology of metaphysics.
The worry, however, is that if we rid theology of metaphysics we are
going to be left without any true beliefs about God. We want to believe, for
example, that God is good. But we also want to get rid of any metaphysical overtones that belief might have. Once those overtones are eliminated,
the belief may well come out not true. And that price—no true theological beliefs—is too high for Hector. So, after filtering the toxic metaphysics
out of the wholesome theology, we also need a non-toxic account of true
theological beliefs.
Hector’s book has three main parts. Chapter 1 tries to remove the nasty
metaphysics from the nourishing theology. Chapters 2–5 try to explain
how theological beliefs can be true without help from metaphysics; they
begin with concept use (chapter 2), move through meaning and reference
(chapters 3–4), and conclude with a novel account of truth (chapter 5).
Chapter 6 applies Hector’s original account of truth to specific beliefs.
Here I focus on chapters 1 and 5.
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Because the book is predicated on the truth of the violence thesis, without that thesis the project loses motivation. I think the violence thesis is
false and so provide some argument against it. I also reply to Hector’s
argument that the correspondence theory of truth is idolatrous. I end by
showing that Hector’s novel account of truth, in terms of taking to be true,
faces serious objections.
This review is critical but not condemnatory. Hector applies a provocative metaphysical thesis to theological language and draws out
problematic consequences. He recognizes that the problems are not local
to theology but instead are perfectly general—residing as they do in very
prevalent theories about concepts, reference, and truth. He then gives
original accounts of concept use, meaning, reference, and truth—all in an
effort to provide a non-metaphysical philosophy of language for theology. This sort of creative, rigorous originality is the kind of philosophy
that begins sub-disciplines. On to the criticism.
Metaphysics Is Not Violent
Hector identifies metaphysics as the thesis that human ideas about a thing
determine its essence.1 For example, the essence of the Eiffel Tower is determined by human ideas about it. Hector traces this meaning of (translations of) “metaphysics” to Heidegger.2
Anyone who does contemporary metaphysics will scratch her head
upon hearing that this determination thesis just is metaphysics. It is
certainly a metaphysical thesis. But it contradicts another metaphysical
thesis, namely, that no human idea about anything determines any essence. And it would be rather strange if a discipline, like metaphysics,
were identical to a thesis that contradicted another thesis that is part of
it. It would be rather like if the discipline of economics were identical to
classical liberalism or if biology were identical to the Lamarkian theory
of evolution. Sensing this, Hector grants that the determination thesis
may just be a particular brand of metaphysics, which he calls essentialistcorrespondentist metaphysics (9). The thesis is essentialist because it is a
thesis about what determines essences. It is correspondentist because, the
thought goes, if an essence is determined by an idea then it corresponds
to that idea.
The violence thesis is not about metaphysics. It is about essentialistcorrespondentist metaphysics (“EC Metaphysics” for short). And the rest
1
In formulating this thesis, Hector sometimes writes as if metaphysics is the thesis that
the essence of a thing is identical to human ideas about it, and other times as if human ideas
determine essences. In personal correspondence he clarified that it is the determination thesis,
not the identity thesis, that is metaphysics.
2
Hector writes “Simply stated, then, Heidegger understands metaphysics as the attempt
to secure human knowledge by identifying the fundamental reality of objects—their being as
such—with our ideas about them” (9); “what sets the latter [metaphysics] apart is precisely
an understanding of the being of beings—their essence—as that which must correspond to
the ideas of a human knower” (9).
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of the project uses EC metaphysics as its target. So a more accurate title
would have been Theology without Essentialist-Correspondentist Metaphysics.
Hector articulates the violence thesis in a few different ways.3 Let the
following be a canonical statement of it:
The Violence Thesis: EC metaphysics (and anything that is EC-metaphysical) does violence to objects by forcing them into categories.
Is The Violence Thesis true? Does the thesis that human idea(s) about a thing
determine its essence do violence to objects by forcing them into categories?
It is hard to tell. It is hard to tell because it is hard to tell what Hector
means by “into” and by “forcing.” Typically, “into” expresses a spatial
relationship—a relationship that holds only between spatially located
things. I can put the spoon into the ice cream because the spoon and the
ice cream are both located in space. I cannot put the spoon into the number two. Suppose “into” expresses a spatial relationship in The Violence
Thesis. Suppose categories are not located in space—e.g., redness is a Platonic abstract category. If so, then The Violence Thesis is false because
nothing (EC metaphysics included) can force an object, like an apple,
into something (e.g., redness) that is not located in space. Suppose instead
that categories are located in space; e.g., suppose categories are human
brain states. If so, then, once again, The Violence Thesis is false because
EC metaphysics does not force things into human brains (if it did it surely
would be violent; thankfully, it does not).
This suggests that “into” should be understood metaphorically, as expressing the falls under relation. We should exchange the The Violence
Thesis for
The Violence Thesis*: EC metaphysics (and anything that is EC metaphysical) does violence to objects by forcing them to fall under certain
categories.
Is the Violence Thesis* true? Does the thesis that human idea(s) about a
thing determine its essence do violence to objects by forcing them to fall
under certain categories?
I can force a piece of metal to expand by heating it. Does any thesis—
any declarative sentence or proposition—force anything to fall under certain categories? Consider the thesis that all humans are mammals. Does
it force humans to fall under the category of mammalhood? Maybe, but
I cannot tell whether Hector agrees. The thesis that all humans are mammals does entail that all humans fall under the category of mammalhood.4

3
Here are two representative statements: “metaphysics does violence to objects by forcing them into predetermined categories” (10) and “Insofar as [essentialist-correspondentist]
metaphysics identifies an object’s essence with one’s ideas about it, it may force the object to
fit into one’s preconceptions, and this conceptual violence may give comfort, in turn, to other
sorts of violence” (12).
4
Assuming that necessarily, if all Fs are Gs, then all Fs fall under the category of G-hood.

234

Faith and Philosophy

So if all Hector means by “force” is entailment then it is (obviously) true
that some theses force things to fall under certain categories.5
On the entailment reading of “force,” I see no violence. On the entailment reading, for a thesis to force something into a category is just for it to
entail that it is in that category. I fail to see how the thesis that all humans
are mammals does violence, in any sense of the word “violence,” to humans. Since the entailment reading is the best one I can give to “force,” I
think The Violence Thesis* is false.
Still, to see why someone might think that The Violence Thesis* is true,
consider Hector’s example of violence:
We see this sort of violence [resulting from EC metaphysics] at its most
graphic when human persons are its object—when, for instance, a woman or
person of color is allowed to “show up” only insofar as he or she fits within
one’s prior conception of femininity, blackness, and so on, and when his or
her attempts to transcend these conceptual boundaries are met with implicit
or explicit resistance. (11)

The violence at issue is one of categorization. According to Hector, we do
violence to persons that fall into a category (e.g., womanhood) when we
affirm that anything that falls into it has certain essential properties. For
example, Will the weirdo thinks it is essential to women that they are at
least six feet tall. The idea is that Will, by having that belief, does violence
to women because persons under six feet tall do not, according to Will’s
metaphysics, fall under the category of womanhood. And excluding persons from certain categories is violent.
Using that example, here is an initially plausible argument for The Violence Thesis*. Suppose that EC metaphysics is true—that human ideas
determine the essences of objects. For example, suppose Will’s idea about
women determine that it is essential to women that they are at least six
feet tall. Then Will’s ideas, plus EC metaphysics, does violence to objects
(namely, women) by forcing people under six feet tall to fall outside the
category of womanhood. That is, Will’s idea that all women are at least
six feet tall plus the thesis that human ideas determine essences together
entail that persons under six feet tall are not women. By entailing that lots
of persons who surely are women are not, EC metaphysics does violence
to women. Therefore . . . The Violence Thesis* is true?
That argument is baldly invalid. At most what follows is that EC metaphysics and Will’s weird belief about female height together do violence to
objects.6 If no one had ever had any false or nasty beliefs about women,
EC metaphysics would not do any violence to anything. The source of
5
If something more sinister than entailment is meant by “force,” I would like to know
what it is.
6
“At most” because we must also add that if some theses T1–Tn together entail that some
people, who self-classify as Fs, are not Fs, then T1–Tn do violence to those people. This additional thesis also looks false to me because, again, I fail to see violence. I see miscategorization or perhaps people self-classifying incorrectly. But I do not see either of those things
necessitating violence.
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violence is the wholly bizarre belief about female height. EC metaphysics
(and metaphysics) is completely irrelevant.
One might reply as follows. EC metaphysics is relevant because even if
no one had ever had any false or nasty beliefs, EC metaphysics would still
do violence to objects. The culprit is not the falsity or the nastiness of the
beliefs that are conjoined to EC metaphysics, because any categorization of
objects (whether true or false, nasty or nice) together with EC metaphysics
does violence to objects.
This view is obviously false. There are infinitely many trivial categorizations of persons: every person is a person, every person exists, every
person is self-identical, every person is self-identical or a friendly purple
dinosaur, every person exists or is a number, etc. This list is infinitely long
and every categorization on it is a necessary truth. The thesis that every
person is a person entails that there are no persons who are not persons—
and so it “forces” persons into the category of personhood. But it obviously
does not do violence to anything.
Suppose you think that these infinitely many trivial truths are, for
some reason, not really categorizations. Perhaps the idea would be that
something is a categorization only if it is more substantive than those bare
logically true categorizations. Still, there are infinitely many such categorizations of persons that do no violence: every person is loved by God, every
person is intrinsically valuable, etc. Add “female” or “black” or whatever
other modifier to “person” you like (e.g., every female person is intrinsically valuable) and you get infinitely many non-violent characterizations
of that kind of person. The Violence Thesis* is false.
Correspondence Is Not Idolatrous
In chapter 5 Hector turns his attention towards a correspondence theory
of truth and highlights a problem for its application to theological beliefs.
The problem is this: if the truth of a belief . . . just is its correspondence to an
object’s fundamental reality, and if it is inappropriate to think of our beliefs
as standing in this sort of relationship to God, then it would appear that our
beliefs cannot be true of God. (201)

But our beliefs can be true of God. So, the truth of a belief is not “just its
correspondence to an object’s fundamental reality.” As a result, the correspondence theory of truth must go.
Hector spends the rest of chapter 5 formulating an alternative account
of truth. But before getting to that alternative account it is worth pausing to examine this argument against the correspondence theory of truth
more carefully. For if the argument against the correspondence theory of
truth is not successful, we lack motivation for providing a distinct account
of truth.
Hector’s intuition against the correspondence theory is that there is
something inappropriate about taking our beliefs to correspond to facts
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about God. For if God is transcendent, then it is inappropriately prideful,
and perhaps even idolatrous, to think that our true beliefs about God correspond to facts about God in just the same way as our true beliefs about
dogs correspond to facts about dogs.
I understand the concern but find it misguided. God is transcendent.
I believe that God is good. Suppose that my belief is true just in case it
corresponds to a fact about God. Then my belief that God is good corresponds to a fact about God and God is transcendent. No contradiction.
Suppose we add that my belief that God is good corresponds to a fact
about God in just the same way as my true belief that dogs shed corresponds to a fact about dogs. Have I entered idolatrous or inappropriate
territory? I don’t see how.
A sensible view of God’s transcendence is that God is far more powerful
than anything else, as morally good as any person could be, is not constrained by the laws of nature, is much smarter than we can understand,
etc. Might it not be the case that God is as morally good as any person could
be, yet it also be a fact about God that God is good? I don’t see why not. My
belief that God is good could well correspond to a fact about God—namely,
the fact that God is good—without “threatening” God’s transcendence or
being idolatrous in any way. I should not go on to add ridiculous theses
like “Oh yeah, and all the truths there are about God are ones human
beings can express. And when I say ‘God is good’ I thereby capture everything there is to say about God’s moral status. Oh yes, and when I say ‘God
is good’ I mean that God is good in exactly the same way that my running
shoes are good.”
The thesis that my belief that God is good corresponds to a fact about
God would, together with those added theses, be presumptuous and perhaps even idolatrous. But I don’t say any of those things, and neither
should anyone else (they are, after all, all preposterous). So there is no
problem saying that my belief that God is good is true and so corresponds
to a fact about God. Concerns about idolatry enter the picture only when
additional, rather naive theses are added. The upshot is that concerns
about idolatry do not successfully motivate rejecting a correspondence
theory of truth.7
“Taking To Be True” Is Not True
In place of a correspondence theory of truth, Hector proposes an account
of truth in terms of taking to be true. The point, again, is to explain truth
while avoiding an idolatrous correspondence theory of truth. His account
of truth in terms of taking to be true is as follows.
We understand the truth of a belief p in terms of taking p to be true. To
take p to be true is just to judge that p is true, which is just to judge that
p gets its subject matter right. To judge that p gets its subject matter right
7
Concerns about idolatry are not the only reasons Hector has for rejecting a correspondence theory of truth; see 202–211 for a discussion of three other problems.
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is to judge that “it goes on in the same way as precedent beliefs that one
judges to be correct” (225).8 Simplifying, we understand the truth of p in
terms of judging that p “goes on in the same way as precedent beliefs that
one judges to be correct.”
This explanation of true beliefs, coupled with a rejection of anything in
the neighborhood of a correspondence-like biconditional, is supposed to
enable us to have true theological beliefs without endorsing an idolatrous
correspondence theory of truth. An example helps here. I understand
the truth of my belief that God is good by understanding my taking that
God is good to be true, which I then understand in terms of my belief that
God is good going on in the same way as precedent beliefs that I judge to
be correct.
This explanation of truth in terms of taking to be true suffers from two
serious defects. First, it is either false or uses “correct” in a technical sense
that needs to be explained. Suppose it uses “correct” in the ordinary colloquial sense to mean true. Then to judge a belief to be correct is just to judge
it to be true.9 On this supposition, Hector’s account is that we understand
the truth of p in terms of judging that p “goes on in the same way as precedent beliefs that one judges to be [true].” More succinctly, we understand
the truth of p in terms of judging that p goes on in the same way as true
precedents of p.
Consider those true precedents of p. If I already understand their truth
(without appeal to their precedents) then there is no barrier to also understanding the truth of the original belief—that God is good—without appeal
to any of its true precedents. So if I understand the truth of its true precedents without appeal to their precedents, then I understand the truth of
that God is good without appeal to its precedents, contradicting Hector’s
account. Suppose, on the other hand, that I understand the truth of its
true precedents only by appeal to their true precedents, and so on ad infinitum. In that case, I understand the truth of the initial belief—that God is
good—only if I make infinitely many judgments. I understand the truth of
the initial belief. I have not made infinitely many judgments. So Hector’s
account is, again, false. Either I understand the truth of its true precedents
only by appeal to their true precedents, or not. Either way, unless Hector
uses “correct” in a technical sense not broadly equivalent to “true,” his
account of truth cannot be true. If he is using “correct” in a non-standard
sense, more explanation is in order.
The second defect is that on Hector’s account there could not have been
a first true belief.10 Consider Tom and Jerry, a (rather heartless) future
See especially 225 and 243.
There is a literature in the philosophy of language on the correctness of assertions that
sharply distinguishes correctness from truth. If Hector is using one of these more rarified
notions of correctness here, it needs to be explained. There is no textual indication that he is.
So I assume that he is using “correct” here in the normal colloquial sense which is broadly
equivalent to “true.”
10
I owe this fine illustration to Michael Rea.
8
9
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couple who volunteers their future child for an anthropological experiment. The experiment is to see how a human child develops when reared
in a wholly alien setting isolated from other human beings (add whatever
we need here for the child to actually thrive and grow, since some studies suggest that without something like social contact humans die). The
anthropologist contacts Tom and Jerry prior to conception. She tells them
they cannot speak in the presence even of the zygote. Upon birth, they
give the child to the anthropologist who seals him (it’s a boy!) in a soundproof capsule and sends the capsule to the moon. The boy grows up on
the moon in total isolation and with no exposure to any human language.
Call the boy “Notrue.”
On Hector’s account of truth, we understand a belief to be true by,
ultimately, judging it to be going on in the same way as precedent true beliefs. Imagine Notrue trying to form his first true belief. Maybe he is, say,
3 years old, sees the Earth outside his moon-colony window, and forms
the belief that we would inscribe using “That is pretty.” Now imagine
Notrue at age nine trying to understand that belief to be true. According
to Hector, Notrue needs to judge it to go on in the same way as precedent
true beliefs. But Notrue thinks there are no precedent beliefs because he
thinks he is the only sentient being there has ever been. On Hector’s account, Notrue can never understand any of his beliefs to be true because
he cannot judge any of them to go on in the same way as precedent true
beliefs because he does not believe there are any precedent true beliefs.
And that seems plainly false. Notrue certainly will have the belief, by
age fifteen, say, that we would inscribe using “Sometimes I get hungry.”
There is no reason (aside from Hector’s account of truth) to think that by
age fifteen Notrue could not understand that it is true that sometimes he
gets hungry.
This defect is not an artifact of a science fiction story. Unless we say
that God has always had infinitely many beliefs of which there is no first
precedent, none of us can understand the truth of any of our beliefs. To
do so in the absence of that infinite with-no-lower-bound series of God’s
beliefs, some person would have initially had to come to understand
a first true belief.11 To do so she would have had to have judged that that
first true belief, first, goes on in the same way as precedent true beliefs.
But first has no precedents. So she could not come to understand its truth.
Only by positing an infinite series of precedent true beliefs had by God
of which there is no first member can Hector’s account of understanding
the truth of a belief get off the ground. This is quite a hefty theological
condition on an account of understanding true belief that is supposed to
be perfectly general.

11
Suppose a million people tried to do so simultaneously. Simultaneous first true beliefs
also lack true precedents. They only have true contemporaries.

